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THE NEW PARADOX OF THE STONE 
Alfred R. Mele and M. P. Smith 
The traditional paradox of the stone may be interpreted as posing a competition between a 
pair of omnipotent beings, represented by God at two different times. The new paradox 
poses a question about simultaneous competition between a pair of omnipotent beings. We 
make use of an attractive Thomistic response to the former paradox in arguing that the 
latter situation is logically possible. 
Fred, an omnipotent being, wishes to have an omnipotent companion. So he cre-
ates Barney. Having created Barney, however, Fred begins to doubt that either of 
them is omnipotent. 
Fred finds it troublesome that neither he nor Barney can create a stone too heavy 
for the other to lift, throw a baseball too fast for the other to hit, or too far for the 
other to catch, and so on. On the other hand, Fred feels as strong as ever. How 
could the appearance of a new face on the scene lessen his own intrinsic abilities? 
He can't ask Barney ifhe feels the same as before, of course; but if Barney were not 
omnipotent, wouldn't that impugn Fred's omnipotence as well? He had tried to 
create another omnipotent being, after all, and when one tries to do something and 
fails, one can't very well call oneself omnipotent. 
There is a way out for Fred, propounded by Thomas Aquinas. I Even omnipotent 
beings, he said, cannot accomplish the logically impossible. Fred's failure to cre-
ate a peer need not count against his omnipotence, provided that the task is an 
impossible one. 
Some have thought the task to be impossible, on the grounds that the coexistence 
of two omnipotent beings is impossible. If there were two omnipotent beings, then, 
in cases of disagreement, at least one would find itself thwarted. But an omnipotent 
being cannot be thwarted. Hence there cannot be two omnipotent beings.2 
This line of reasoning ignores the implications of the thesis it seeks to employ. 
That Fred cannot make a stone too heavy for Barney to lift, or throw a ball too 
fast for Barney to hit, does not count against his omnipotence, provided that 
Barney is omnipotent too. An omnipotent being can lift any stone, no matter 
how heavy, or hit any pitch, no matter how fast. Since it is impossible for there 
to be a stone too heavy for an omnipotent being to lift, or a ball too fast for him 
to hit, it does not count against Fred's omnipotence that he cannot make a stone 
heavy enough, or throw a ball hard enough, to thwart such a being. 3 
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It might be objected that we have unduly restricted the means available to 
omnipotent beings in their attempts to create immovable or unstoppable stones. 
Fred is not limited to creating stones of different weights, or throwing them at 
different speeds. There may be any number of ways in which a stone could be 
immovable or unstoppable; it might be extremely slippery, for example. 
We need take no position, however, on whether someone suitably clever could 
make a stone unliftable or unstoppable even by an omnipotent being. For these 
deeds of lifting and stopping are either possible or they are impossible. If they 
are impossible, then the inability of an entity to perform them does not impugn 
its omnipotence. If they are possible tasks, on the other hand, the inability of 
another being to prohibit an omnipotent being from accomplishing them does 
not count against its omnipotence either. Thwarting an omnipotent being's execu-
tion of a possible task is not possible, and hence cannot be expected even of the 
omnipotent.' 
Thus the Thomistic solution to the original paradox of the stone seems to 
allow a multiplicity of omnipotent beings. In fact, the question, "Can God create 
a stone that he cannot lift?", poses a competition between a pair of omnipotent 
beings, represented by God at different times. If the fact that God cannot now 
create a stone that he will be unable to lift later does not count against his 
omnipotence, then the fact that Fred cannot create a stone that Barney would be 
unable to lift should not count against Fred's omnipotence. 
So far our omnipotent duo has been alternating, each taking a tum at attempting 
to outdo the other. This pattern is the result of the way that the stone paradox 
is usually stated, involving as it does different temporal stages of the same being. 
In the traditional stone paradox, each omnipotent being, represented by a temporal 
stage of God, gets exactly one tum .. The omnipotent being to make the last 
move, the later temporal stage, always wins. Once understood, the outcome of 
the stone paradox is no harder to predict than that of a (finitely long) game of 
one-upmanship between Fred and Barney-say a friendly slam-dunk contest in 
basketball. The situation is more confusing, however, if we allow competitions 
without a sequence of turns. 
Suppose that Fred attempts to lift a given stone and that Barney simultaneously 
attempts to keep the stone where it is. If we accept that any stone can be either 
moved or kept still, and accept also that an omnipotent being can move or keep 
still whatever can be moved or kept still, then it appears that the stone must 
both move and not move at the same time. Since an omnipotent being's endeavor 
to perform a possible task cannot be thwarted, Barney cannot block Fred's 
attempt to move the stone, nor can Fred thwart Barney's attempt to keep the 
stone stationary. So the stone must move and it must not move. 
Alternatively, we might decide along Thomistic lines that 'moving a stone 
that an omnipotent being wishes to hold in place,' and 'holding in place a stone 
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that an omnipotent being wishes to move,' do not describe logically possible 
tasks, so that even omnipotent beings cannot perform them. Would the stone 
then neither move nor not move? The Thomistic account may be capable of 
preserving the omnipotence of both Fred and Barney. But what happens to the 
stone?5 
One suggestion is that, as a consequence of the struggle, the stone might go 
out of existence. If the disputed stone ceases to exist, then it will not have moved 
(if this implies having a different location afterwards), nor will it have remained 
stationary (if this implies having the same location afterwards). Thus, there is 
something that can happen to the stone. 
Other contests would not be resolved by this trick, however. Suppose that 
Fred undertakes to destroy a given stone that Barney wishes to preserve. Here, 
the intended tasks aim, not at contrary states of affairs, but at contradictory 
states. Does this contest have a possible outcome?6 
We shall argue shortly that it does. Let us return first, however, to the main 
bout over the motion/rest of the stone. We suggest that the stone can move 
provided that Fred doesn't move it, and that it can remain unmoved so long as 
Barney doesn't stop it from moving. More precisely, the stone can move provided 
that nothing moves it, and it can remain at rest provided that nothing keeps it 
from moving. That is, what is impossible in the scenario at issue are certain 
types of action, not the states of affairs which those actions would produce. 
Nothing can move a stone that an omnipotent being wills to hold still, and 
nothing can hold a stone that an omnipotent being wills to move. So in the 
omnipotent face-off, both types of action-moving the contested stone and 
holding it in place-are impossible. But the stone's moving and the stone's 
remaining still are, nevertheless, possible states of affairs. In a world in which 
there are uncaused events, the contested stone may either move or not move, 
even though it is impossible for anything to move it or to hold it in place-
including omnipotent beings like Fred and Barney. Paradoxically, the omnipo-
tence of each can be preserved provided that both are thwarted. 
On our suggested solution to the new? stone paradox, neither Fred nor Barney 
will prevail. Nevertheless, their omnipotence is not impugned, since on the 
Thomistic line even omnipotent beings cannot do the impossible. Nor are we 
committed to the absurdity that the stone (assuming that it does not cease to 
exist) can neither move nor not move, since either may happen provided that its 
happening is uncaused. Even head-to-head competition between omnipotent 
beings over incompatible states of affairs is possible in a world in which events 
may be uncaused. And this is true even when the states are contradictories and 
not merely contraries. In the destruction/preservation case, e.g., the stone may 
either continue to exist or cease to exist, provided that the outcome is uncaused. 
Of course, we still have no way of telling what will happen to the contested 
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stones in such cases, but at least we know that it is possible for something to 
happen to them. When the intended tasks aim at contradictory states of affairs, 
the outcome, we can confidently say, will be uncaused. Its being uncaused is 
the result of simultaneous competition between omnipotent beings. When the 
contest is over contrary states of affairs, there will be some distinct caused or 
uncaused resolution. 
Suppose that Barney tries to keep a particular stone in place, that Fred attempts 
to move it,and that, as it happens, the stone moves. We have argued that the 
omnipotence of both can be preserved if the stone's motion (or, in another case, 
its lack of motion) is uncaused. But one might think that Fred does cause the 
stone to move in the case under consideration. After all, if he had not intervened, 
the stone would not have moved; for there would have been nothing to prevent 
Barney from keeping the stone in place. Thus, one might contend, Fred is 
causally responsible for the stone's moving, and therefore the stone's moving 
is not uncaused. 
The confusion here is not difficult to locate. One must distinguish between 
causing the stone to move and causing a condition under which it is possible for 
the stone to move. On our suggestion, Fred renders impossible Barney's keeping 
the stone stationary. Similarly, Barney makes it impossible for Fred to move 
the stone. 8 Jointly, they create a situation in which the stone's behavior may be 
uncaused. Rather than causing the stone to move, Fred's activity (in conjunction 
with Barney's) makes it possible for the stone to undergo uncaused motion (or 
uncaused non-motion). 
One who grants that the stone's movement has no direct or proximate cause 
might wish to contend that Fred's behavior is an indirect cause of the stone's 
moving; for his activity helps to generate the first-order stalemate condition under 
which the stone moved. But this is mistaken. An indirect cause of an event, E, 
contributes to the causation of E by causing something else that contributes, 
either directly or indirectly, to the causation of E. Ultimately, any indirect cause 
of E is linked to E by a proximate cause. However, the stone's movement, ex 
hypothesi, has no proximate cause. Fred's behavior cannot be an indirect cause 
of the stone's moving, since there is no direct cause. 
The reader may still have a related worry. Since Barney was able to prevent 
Fred from moving the stone, wasn't he able as well to prevent the contested 
stone from moving simpliciter? After all, if Barney succeeds in preventing Fred 
from moving the stone, it would seem he can succeed in preventing anything 
from moving it. Surely, then, he can prevent the stone's moving?9 
This worry derives from the erroneous supposition that having the ability to 
prevent anything from moving the stone is sufficient for having the ability to 
prevent the stone from moving. In a world in which uncaused events occur, the 
stone may move even if nothing moves it. Hence, it doesn't follow from an 
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agent's being able to prevent anything from moving the stone that it is able to 
prevent the stone from moving. 
Moreover, the assumption that Barney, in our scenario, is able to prevent the 
stone from moving leads quickly to absurdity. Barney's prospective act of pre-
venting the contested stone from moving is on all fours with Fred's prospective 
act of causing that stone to move. And, ex hypothesi, Barney is no more powerful 
than Fred. Hence, if we are entitled to suppose that Barney is able to execute 
his intention to prevent the stone from moving, we are entitled as well to suppose 
that Fred can execute his contrary intention. But omnipotent beings succeed in 
doing whatever they intend to do, provided that their doing it is possible. Con-
sequently, given the assumption under consideration, Barney prevents the stone 
from moving while Fred causes it to move. And this, of course, is a logical 
impossibility! 
Barney is able to prevent Fred from moving the stone in our example. Indeed, 
he does prevent Fred from moving it: if he had not interfered, Fred would have 
moved the stone. However, this is quite compatible with Barney's being unable 
to prevent the contested stone from moving, i.e., unable to cause it to remain 
stationary. To keep the stone from moving he must do more than stalemate 
Fred-he must defeat Fred. 
Now, there are scenarios in which an uncaused resolution would render one 
of our heroes victorious over the other. Suppose, e.g., that Fred knows that the 
uncaused result of any possible simultaneous competition between him and 
Barney over the stone would be the stone's moving and that he battles Barney 
with the intention of setting the stage for this uncaused result. JO The stone's 
moving constitutes a victory for Fred, even though he does not move it; for it 
is the desired goal of an effective plan of action and is achieved in the way 
represented in the plan. II 
Is Barney's omnipotence impugned in this scenario? Not at all. Though it was 
possible for Fred, in battling Barney, to bring about a condition under which 
the stone would move, Barney could not similarly produce circumstances under 
which the stone would remain unmoved; for the upshot of simultaneous compet-
ition could only be the stone's uncaused motion. Barney's best effort, given 
Fred's resistance and the foreknown uncaused result of any simultaneous compet-
ition, could only help to generate the first-order stalemate condition under which 
Fred would win a second-order victory. But Barney's plight is no worse than 
that of the first player in a finite sequential contest between two omnipotent 
beings. From the fact that a stone-maker cannot create a stone that an omnipotent 
being cannot then lift, it does not follow that the former is not omnipotent. 
There, victory is a function of the order of moves, not of relative power. In the 
latest Fred/Barney scenario, similarly, victory is conferred by chance, and defeat 
does not establish limited power. 
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The Thomistic resolution of the original paradox of the stone allows for a 
multiplicity of omnipotent beings. This should not be surprising, since the original 
stone paradox is just a disguised contest between a pair of omnipotent beings. 
The new paradox of the stone, in which the contest is made explicit and allowed 
to be simultaneous rather than sequential, raises more serious problems. Even 
here there is no logical contradiction, however. We see no logical difficulties 
peculiar to a host of omnipotent beings, once the individual case is admitted. 
This may suggest to some readers that the Thomistic resolution of the old 
paradox of the stone is too good. As omnipotence is ordinarily conceived, an 
omnipotent being's causal power is effective power-he executes his intentions 
at will. However, the Thomistic line makes room for omnipotent beings whose 
intentions to alter the world are never effective. Suppose that some possible 
world is partially populated by a pair of omnipotent beings who are in constant 
conflict over what might be called "supra-preventive" states of affairs. Neither 
intends merely to prevent the other from executing its intentions; rather each 
intends, in everything that it does, to accomplish something above and beyond 
this, e.g., to destroy the stone that the other wishes to preserve. Suppose further 
that neither can tell in advance what the result of simultaneous competition will 
be. These beings will accomplish less than the ordinary human agent. 
This problem is not peculiar to a Thomistic conception of omnipotence. Few 
philosophers would require of an omnipotent being that it be able to do what is 
logically impossible, even if they reject the Thomistic idea that the ability to 
perform any logically possible action is a necessary condition of being omnipo-
tent. 12 At the heart of the problem lies the very plausible assumption (VPA) that 
an omnipotent being will actualize any possible state of affairs that it intends to 
actualize, provided that its actualizing the state is possible. 13 However, in cases 
of simultaneous competition of the sort just described between omnipotent beings, 
neither can emerge victorious. The only possible resolution is a stalemate. But 
if this is right, then given VPA, neither is able to do what it intends in these cases. 
Does it follow that the competing omnipotent beings in our latest imaginary 
world are in fact impotent? Not at all. They may each be possessed of boundless 
power. Their problem lies in their aspirations. 14 
Davidson College 
NOTES 
I. Summa Theologiae la. q. 25, art. 3. Cf. George Mavrodes, "Some Puzzles Concerning Omnipo-
tence," Philosophical Review LXXII (1963): pp. 221-223. 
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2. Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, distinction 2, nn. 178-181; reprinted in L. Urban & D. Walton, 
eds., The Power of Cod (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 91f. Louis Werner rebuts 
several variations of this argument in his "Some Omnipotent Beings," Critica 5 (1971): 55-69; 
reprinted in Urban & Walton, pp. 94- 106. 
3. If Barney is not essentially omnipotent, there are possible worlds in which he is not omnipotent. 
In some such world there is a stone that Barney tries and fails to lift. However, we are concerned 
in this paper only with possible worlds in which both of our main characters are omnipotent. One 
way to restrict the discussion to this block of worlds would be to suppose that both characters are 
essentially omnipotent. But one of us is skeptical about essential properties for individuals. Con-
sequently, we simply stipulate that such assertions in this paper as "an omnipotent being cannot be 
thwarted" are to be read as expressing only de dicta modalities. 
It is worth noting that if a particular omnipotent being can render itself non-omnipotent, then, 
other things being equal, there is nothing to exclude the possibility of its creating a stone that it 
cannot lift. One way to accomplish the trick is as follows: first, the being irretrievably sheds enough 
of its stone-lifting power that it is now too weak to lift stones weighing more than n pounds; then 
it creates a stone weighing more than n pounds. Can we suppose, similarly, that if Fred is omnipotent, 
he should be able to limit Barney's stone-lifting power and then create a stone too heavy for Barney 
to lift? Suppose that Barney does not cooperate. Suppose, indeed, that Barney intends to retain all 
of his power and to limit Fred's stone-creating capacity. What happens then? The central argument 
of this paper applies to this contest as well. 
4. This is not to deny that there are possible tasks that cannot be performed by omnipotent beings-
e.g., the task of lifting a stone such that, while one is lifting it, it is being lifted solely by a 
non-omnipotent being. But in such cases no agent thwarts an omnipotent being's execution of the 
possible task. 
5. Cf. Mavrodes's final, unanswered query (p. 270) in his "Necessity, Possibility, and the Stone 
which Cannot be Moved," Faith and Philosophy 2 (1985): 265-271. 
6. Werner contends-mistakenly, as we shall show-that if two omnipotent beings will contradictory 
states of affairs (e.g., that a particular stone continue to exist beyond f and that that stone cease to 
exist at f), there is no possible resolution, and that it is therefore "logically impossible for there to 
be two [omnipotent beings] with contradictory wills" ("Some Omnipotent Beings," p. 100 in Urban 
& Walton). 
7. We do not mean to take credit, of course, for the idea of dueling omnipotent beings. See the 
references in note 2. 
8. Strictly speaking, what is impossible are the following: (I) "keeping stationary a stone that an 
omnipotent being wills to move"; and (2) "moving a stone that an omnipotent beings wills to hold 
in place." In each case an omnipotent being "makes" a task impossible by making it true that the 
prospective task fits one or the other of the descriptions. 
9. A similar question can be raised about Fred's preventive ability, of course. 
10. Though uncaused events are difficult, if not impossible, to predict, omnipotence is often linked 
to omniscience and an omniscient being's knowledge of "future" events need not involve prediction. 
11. Cf. Myles Brand, Intending and Acting (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), Ch. 1, Sec.7. 
12. For objections to this idea, see, e.g., Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1977), pp. 150-152; Edward Wierenga, "Omnipotence Defined," Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 42 (1983): 363-375; and Thomas Flint & Alfred Freddoso, "Maximal 
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Power," in A. Freddoso, ed., The Existence aruJ Nature of God (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame 
University Press, 1983), pp. 81-113. 
13. Notice how weak the assumption is. The claim is not that, if it intends to do so, an omnipotent 
being will actualize any possible state of affairs that can be actualized, but only that, if it intends 
to do so, it will actualize any possible state that it can actualize. Even so, the same cannot be said 
of ordinary non-omnipotent beings. For example, even the best basketball players occasionally miss 
freethrows that they are both able to make and intend to make. (Notice also that VPA states only a 
necessary condition of omnipotence, and that it consequently is not challenged by the possible 
existence of some clearly non-omnipotent being who, due in part to extreme limitations on what it 
is possible for it to do, will actualize any possible state that it intends to actualize, provided that its 
actualizing the state is possible.) 
14. We wish to thank an anonymous referee for valuable criticism of the penultimate draft and for 
useful references to the literature on omnipotence. Revisions were written during Mele's tenure of 
a 1985/86 NEH Fellowship for College Teachers. 
